Extradition of Non-Fugitive Criminals by Marsh, Rick E.
EXTRADITION OF NON-FUGITIVE CRIMINALS
Johnson v. Burke,
148 N.E.2d 413 (Ind. 1958)
In a habeas corpus proceeding, petitioner challenged the power of
the state of Indiana to extradite him to Arizona, contending that he was
not a fugitive from justice since he had not been in the demanding
state at the time of the commission of the crime with which he was
charged.' The court refused to issue the writ, basing its decision upon
the Indiana enactment of The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.2
This act confers upon Indiana the authority to extradite persons not
physically present in the demanding state at the time of the commission
of the crime. Upon appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court, petitioner
urged that the constitutional grant of authority to the federal govern-
mert to legislate on the subject of extradition pre-empted the field and
thus the state statute is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Indiana
rejected this argument and affirmed the decision of the lower court.
The extradition clause of the Constitution provides only for the
extradition of "fugitives," i.e., those who flee from the justice of the
demanding state.3 The federal statute enacted under the authority of
this clause merely establishes the procedure.4 Because neither the Con-
stitution nor the statute provides for the extradition of non-fugitive
criminals, several decisions of the United States Supreme Court, all
antedating the passage of The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act,
(hereinafter referred to as the Extradition Act), held that a person who
had never been in the demanding state could not be extradited.5 The
Extradition Act provides for the extradition of persons who are not fugi-
tives from justice.' It was created to meet the need for a means of ex-
traditing criminals not physically present in the demanding state at the
time of the commission of the crime and thereby not regarded as fugi-
tives.7 The constitutionality of the Extradition Act has been upheld in
'Johnson v. Burke, 148 N.E.2d 413 (Ind. 1958).
2 IND. ANN. STAT. § 9419 to -448 (1956).
3 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. "A person charged in any State with treason,
felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State,
shall on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be
delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime."
4 I8 U.S.C. § 3182 (1952).
5 South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412 (1933); Innes v. Tobin, 240 U.S.
127 (1916); Hyatt v. People ex reL Corkran, 188 U.S. 691 (1903); Robb v.
Connolly, 111 U.S. 624 (1884).
6 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME
CONTROL c. II (1955). "The governor of this state may also surrender . . . any
person in this state ... even though the accused was not in that state at the time
of the commission of the crime, and has not fled therefrom."
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every state jurisdiction where the question has been raised. It has also been
given the stamp of constitutional approval by the 'lower federal courts.8
Now the highest court of the State of Indiana joins in this favorable
judgment.
The Indiana court made reference to a California appellate decision
rendered ten years before the principal case. In Ex parte Morgan,9 peti-
tioner, while in Los Angeles, conspired to commit a crime in Denver. He
was awaiting extradition to Colorado, a state which he had never entered,
when he sued for a writ of habeas corpus. The court said:
Moreover, while state legislation impairing the full operation
of the Constitution and laws of Congress would be void, yet a
state may enact laws on the subject of interstate extradition
at a stage'prior to that which the Constitution and federal laws
have designated as the time at which they take cognizance of
it. No reason in law, expediency, or comity has been suggested
why extradition should be limited to those who were physically
present in the state at the time the crime was committed.
Many crimes may be committed in a state while the culprit
remains without its borders.1 0
The Morgan court recognized that there are two classes of persons
who can be extradited. The federal law applies only to fugitives and
the Extradition Act applies to non-fugitives. The decision of the Cali-
fornia court was affirmed in both the federal district court and the court
of appeals.1" The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 2
The validity of the Extradition Act depends upon whether or not
the states have the 'power to legislate in this area. Although the United
States Supreme Court has never ruled on this question of federal power,
the issue seems to be as free from doubt as the unanimity of the state
courts suggests. If analysis commences with the basic premise that the
federal government is one of limited powers, then Congress would
appear to be empowered to deal only with that type of extradition
where the party sought is technically a fugitive from justice. Legislative
FoRM STATE LAws 318. "The language of these sections of The Extradition Act
was designed to cover cases not clearly reached by prior extradition laws. Prior
to 1935 it was possible to extradite only those criminals who were held to be
fugitives, that is, who had been physically present in the state in which the crime
was committed and had fled therefrom. It has been held that one who commits a
crime against the laws of a state by acts done outside of that state was not a
fugitive from justice within the meaning of the extradition act. The uniform act
was drafted to meet the need for authority to extradite in such cases." Chapman v.
Hayward, 160 Neb. 664-, 71 N.W.2d 201 (1 t-5 5 ).
8 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, op. cit. supra note 6, at 38.
9 Ex parte Morgan, 86 Cal. App. 2d 217, 194 P.2d 800 (1948).
10 Ibid.
1178 F. Supp. 756 (1948), 175 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1949).
12 Ex parte Morgan, 338 U.S. 827 (1949).
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power beyond this point would fall to the states. This is the general
approach taken by a recent Ohio case 3 and by the New York case of
People ex rel. Waldman v. Ruthazer.
14
If federal power is deemed to reach all forms of extradition, by
no stretch of the rules of statutory construction can the federal statute
be interpreted as bearing a negative inference which would operate to
prohibit state action where the person sought is a non-fugitive criminal.
This is what the courts have meant by intimating that Congress has
the power but has not pre-empted the field."5 Pressing the doctrine of
pre-emption to the extreme of prohibiting state action would far outdo
the Nelson case," 6 itself subject to strong criticism.
The constitutional provision at issue constitutes a section of an article
which abounds in provisions that establish minimum standards of inter-
state behavior. Found in this context, it is most logically susceptible to
the interpretation that it establishes a minimum standard for extradition,
i.e., the states should at least extradite those who are fugitives from
justice. This minimum standard concept gives rise to a countervailing
argument for the criminal which is that the provision provides a mini-
mum protection for him, i.e., the states should extradite only if the
person is a fugitive from justice. The courts have not accepted the
minimum protection argument, but have given the Constitution a liberal
construction in order to effectuate and expedite the administration of
interstate justice. The result of such liberal interpretation is that the
states should at least extradite fugitives, but they can, within the limits
of due process, extradite all other criminals found in their jurisdiction.17
It seems quite reasonable to assume that the authors of the Constitution
would not have wanted to confer immunity upon certain types of inter-
state criminals. They desired to provide a summary proceeding whereby
the states of the Union could promptly aid one another in bringing to
trial persons accused of a crime in one state and found in another.18
To draw a negative inference at the constitutional level, would not be
consistent with the relatively great state concern compared with the
rather minimal national interest. Rick E. Marsh
13 Culbertson v. Sweeney, 70 Ohio App. 344, 44 N.E.2d 807 (1942).
14 144 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1955).
15 Innes v. Tobin, supra note 5; McLarnan v. Hasson, 243 Iowa 379, 49
NAV.2d 887 (1951) ; In re Harris, 180 Mass. 309, 34 N.E.2d 504 (1941); Ex parte
Arrington, 270 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. 1954).
16 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). The United States Supreme
Court, in a six to three decision, held that in view of the evident congressional
purpose to pre-empt the field of anti-sedition legislation, the predominant federal
interest in the field, and the danger of conflict between enforcement of state se-
dition acts and administration of the federal program, the Smith Act superseded the
Pennsylvania Sedition Act, precluding enforcement of the Pennsylvania act against
a person charged with acts of sedition against the federal government.
17Ex parte Morgan, supra note 9; English v. Matowitz, 148 Ohio St. 39,
72 N.E.2d 898 (1947).
18 Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128 (1917).
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